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Abstract 
  At 9 November 2010, the European Court of Justice, in a preliminary ruling, decided to depart from 
the interpretation promoted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in the matter of the 
application of the exclusion clauses. The European Court considered that no proportionality test between human 
rights protection and gravity of a crime is to be applied in the case of a person suspected of having committed an 
act contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations. By eliminating this test, the Court is sending a 
signal on rethinking the asylum institution, from a humanitarian tool that it became, to a political instrument. 
This decision could not be read alone; corroborated to the concerns already raised on the suitable use of the 
asylum instrument to address massive humanitarian needs, it would indicate a reorientation in the interpretation 
of international norms governing the refugee law.  
Still, the human rights organs and the European Court of Human Rights continue to refer to the asylum as a 
situation where a humanitarian perspective, reflected in the proportionality test, or for those mechanisms the 
risk of human rights violation probability test, is still valid. The two apparently divergent directions will need to 
converge in the implementation of the European Union regulations on asylum.  
This paper is exploring the possible reinterpretation of the European norms, trying to identify the new trends in 
the political perspective of asylum and the limitations to these trends that the respect for human rights is 
establishing.  
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1.  Introduction 
The refugee law is in quest of a redefinition. The last twenty years have shown that the 
humanitarian perspective, reflected primary in the work of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, although very appreciated, is not succeeding in coping with, on one hand, the massive 
influx of refugees which do not always fulfill the criteria set down in the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 (here after “the Geneva Convention”) and on 
the other hand with the restrictions imposed by the immigration regulations. The development of 
human rights law had a major impact on the interpretation and application of the refugee definition, 
extending it as far as the notion of discrimination and the standard of protection from the State of 
origin are concerned, but also weakening its political dimension. Against this background, new 
theories immerged, trying to rediscover the essence of asylum as refugee protection and to clarify its 
relation with the humanitarian approach
1.  
 
This rediscover also determines a reinterpretation of the exclusion clauses, i.e. those 
provisions in the Geneva Convention that are establishing the persons who, although having a well-
founded fear of persecution, are undeserving of international protection because they committed 
certain acts that show the are unworthy, undignified of such a response from a State.  
Traditionally, the application of the exclusion clauses were conditional, at least in part, by the 
performance of a proportionality test; a person fulfilling the criteria laid down in Geneva Convention 
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would not be excluded from being a refugee if his or her need form protection overweighs the need 
to sanction the acts committed.  
However, if one is approaching the refugee concept from a political perspective, the 
humanitarian considerations in the application of the exclusion clauses are no longer justified.  
This trend seems to be adopted by the European Court of Justice in its recent case-law; in the 
context of the development of an European asylum law, where the European Court will play a major 
role as the only institution with the authority to interpret European Union regulations, it is clear that 
the direction she is offering is essential for all the Member States.  
 
2. The context: factual background and questions referred 
 
The judgment rendered on November 9
th by the European Court of Justice in the cases 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland against B and D (joined cases C-57/09 and C-101/09)
2 was issued in a 
preliminary ruling proceeding generated by the German Federal Administrative Court, who asked the 
European Court to clarify the interpretation of the exclusion clauses from the refugee status, as 
stipulated by the Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (hereafter “Directive 
2004/83”), in its article 12.  
This European piece of secondary legislation had the aim of ensuring that Member States 
apply common criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection 
and of guiding the competent national bodies of Member States in the application of the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951.  
According to its article 12, a person is disqualified from being a refugee where there are 
serious reasons for considering that, inter alia, he or she has committed a serious non-political crime 
outside the country of refuge prior to his or her admission as a refugee; or he or she has been guilty 
of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the Preamble and 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations
3.The questions referred to the European Court 
aimed at a clarification of the notion of a “serious non-political crime” and of an “act contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations”, in order to determine if the participation as a member 
in an organization listed as a terrorist one could be qualified as entering into one of the two categories 
of deeds excluding the person from being a refugee; they were also requesting a response on the 
application of a proportionality test between the seriousness of the crime, and therefore the need to 
condemn it and its perpetrator, and the risk faced by the person if disqualified from being a refugee. 
Thirdly, the questions referred to the European Court were enquiring over the place, in the 
application of the proportionality test, of the existence in the national legal system, of protection 
against deportation under the prohibition of torture and other ill treatments rule. 
The questions raised in fact some interesting issues relating to, on the one hand, the value of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees guide on implementation of the Geneva 
Convention and if this body’s practice would be a source of inspiration for the European Court as it 
has been, for almost 35 five years for the national courts and, on the other hand, on the character of 
asylum, understood as protection for the refugees.  
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The German authorities seemed to have difficulties in determining whether, from the 
perspective of the European law, persons that belonged to organizations listed as terrorist were to be 
excluded from being a refugee; in fact, the lower German courts considered that an asylum seeker 
should not be excluded from being a refugee without a proper application of the proportionality test, 
even if he or she had committed, before being admitted on the German territory, a serious non-
political crime. The two applicants in the domestic procedures were former members of 
organizations listed as terrorist in accordance with Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism
4.  
The request for asylum filled by the first applicant, B., was rejected as he confessed that as a 
schoolboy he had been a sympathizer of the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front/Party 
(DHKP/C). Engaged in guerilla fighting for this organization in the period between 1993 and 1995, 
he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment, after giving statements under torture. While in 
prison, he was again sentenced to life imprisonment for the killing of a fellow prisoner. Released 
from custody on heath grounds, he left Turkey and entered Germany.  
The second case was generated by the decision of German authorities to revoke the status of 
refugee, previously recognized to D., a former guerrilla fighter for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and 
one of its senior officials. He was a member of this organization since 1990, but in 2000, following 
some political differences with other leaders, he decided to leave the organization.  
Two preliminary remarks are worth making in connection to these cases: the first one is 
related to the qualification of their conduct by the domestic jurisdictions as serious non-political 
crimes; the second remark concerns the demarche of the Federal Administrative Court (the instance 
that requested the preliminary ruling of the European Court): although this tribunal is acknowledging 
the fact it is bound by the findings of the lower courts, nevertheless, it is requesting the European 
Court to clarify if the conduct of the applicants is a serious non-political crime or an act contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
 
The relevant rules of international law at the time of the judgment 
As mentioned in the previous sections of this article, the Geneva Convention represents the 
cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. In fact, as recognized by 
the European legislation, the Geneva Convention represents both the source of inspiration but also 
the goal, as the Directive 2004/83 sets as objective to achieve a common application of the criteria 
for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection. Against this 
background, it is useful to recall the main rules regarding the exclusion of certain persons from being 
refugees, on account of their conduct that makes them undeserving of international protection. 
According to article 1 F of the Geneva Convention, ‘the provisions of this Convention shall not apply 
to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:  
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as 
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisionin respect of such crimes;  
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his 
admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ 
The first hypothesis is of no interest for the present study; the other two are invoked in the 
European Court’s ruling and therefore deserve our attention. The intention of the drafters of the 
Convention was to ensure that important fugitives from justice are not able to avoid the jurisdiction 
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of a state in which they may lawfully face punishment
 5 . As far as the exclusion clause relating to the 
perpetration of a serious non political crime is concerned, it is to be noted that not all the extraditable 
offences were to be considered serious; although no list, exemplificative or exhaustive was drawn up, 
the drafters were determined to exclude the offences punishable by three months’ imprisonment and 
referred to capital crimes 
6 as being covered by the exclusion clause. It is also interesting to note in 
connection to this exclusion clause, that its application is only possible if the punishment faced by the 
asylum seeker were to be or would be applied in a non discriminatory way and that receiving States 
are not to ignore the risk that would be done by returning the claimant to face prosecution or 
punishment
7 or, in other words “the well-founded fear of persecution”.  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has, over the years, and in the fulfilling 
the task of supervising the application of the provisions of the Geneva Convention, issued series of 
Background Notes and Guidelines on the interpretation to be given to the conventional norms. Its 
task was truly remarkable taking into consideration the fact that the Geneva Convention is 
international in the affirmation of the refugee status, but essentially national in its application. 
Therefore, the role of the High Commissioner was to ensure as broad uniformity as possible in the 
application, by domestic authorities and courts, of the disposition of the Convention. And to combat 
the risk of very divergent interpretation on the notion of a refugee, it even elaborated a Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
8.  
With respect to the exclusion clause for the commission of a serious non-political crime, the 
UNHCR firstly pointed out the offences that would attain the level of seriousness: crimes against the 
physical integrity of a person, crimes committed through the use of violence. The traditional 
interpretation of the UNHCR would place terrorist acts under this exclusion clause, as the alleged 
political objective of such acts is clearly annihilated by the violence of means and no longer 
predominant. The other exclusion clause of interest to this study refers to the commission of an act 
contrary to the purposes and objectives of the United Nations. Although there was agreement for the 
inclusion of this clause in the draft of the Convention, the reasons behind it were very diverse and 
confusing: some representatives limited its application to war collaborators in the Second World War 
or to acts similar to the gravity of war crimes, while others thought of it as a prohibition for refugees 
to engage in activities contrary to the country of origin. Another suggestion for the understanding of 
this clause refers to the commission of acts such as racial discrimination or denial of the right of self-
determination.  
As the terms of the purposes and objective are general and vague, the UNHCR recommended 
careful and narrow consideration of this exclusion clause. As the Charter of the United Nations 
bounds States, in principle only persons in positions of power would appear capable of committing 
such acts
9. Still, the discussion is left open for the cases involving a terrorist act.  
From the language of the 1951 Geneva Convention, it would appear that the application of the 
exclusion clauses is mandatory (“the provisions shall not apply”). Commenting on the 
proportionality considerations, the UNHCR in its analysis, is invoking the humanitarian object and 
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purpose of the Convention to justify the necessity of assessing the respect for human rights in the 
application of the exclusion clauses. In the words of the UNHCR “as with any exception to a human 
rights guarantee, the exclusion clauses must therefore be applied in a manner proportionate to their 
objective, so that the gravity of the offence in question is weighed against the consequences of 
exclusion. Such a proportionality analysis would, however, not normally be required in the case of 
crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and acts falling under article 1F(c), as the acts covered 
are so heinous.”
10  
Several consequences are to be drawn from the drafters’ intention and the UNHCR 
interpretation. Firstly, although the terms of the Convention would support a mandatory application 
of the exclusion clauses (that is, any person having committed such acts should not recognize as a 
refugee), in fact, their application is subject, to a wider or narrower degree, to a proportionality test. 
This test would allow striking a fair balance between the seriousness of the crime and the need to see 
it punished and the risk the person is facing. It is to be noted that the result of the proportionality test 
would be either the revocation or cancellation or non-recognition of the refugee status or the 
maintenance or recognition of this status.  
This is important to underline, because the proportionality test is similar to the one applied by 
the human rights organs in deciding if a measure restricting the exercise of a right represents a 
legitimate interference or a violation of that right. Still, its consequences in the field of refugees’ 
protection go beyond the simple avoidance of a violation to someone’s rights. A person who 
committed a serious non-political crime would face an inhuman punishment or an unfair trial. Two 
possibilities are opened to a receiving State at that point, according to the domestic practice: either to 
have recourse to proportionality considerations, either to consider that such a punishment or trial 
represents a violation of a human right so they should be dealt with from the human rights 
perspective. However, the consequences are not the same and therefore the two possibilities should 
not be seen as excluding each other, but as complementary, the second one being activated if the first 
one would lead to the exclusion from being a refugee. As to the consequences, the application of 
proportionality considerations would result in the maintenance of the refugee status, with all the 
rights it confers and with the guarantee of non-refoulement that is more protective that that 
prohibition to return under human rights law. In fact, in refugee law, the existence of a threat to the 
life or freedom of a person on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership 
to a particular social group is prohibiting any measure of expulsion or return: under human rights 
law, the individual must prove a real risk and concrete risk of being subjected to ill treatment
11.  
The automatic exclusion, on the ground that the person is protected under human rights law, 
would simply mean the prohibition to expel or return, without any particular statue being afforded to 
that person; besides, the threshold of proof is higher that refugees’ non-refoulement. Only a 
probability of individual application would stay the execution of the return measure.  
Secondly, in general the test would apply only in connection with the perpetration of serious 
non-political crimes; still, although normally excluded from the application in the other hypothesis, 
the test is not completely ignored; in some extraordinary cases, the UNHCR applied the test even 
when crimes against humanity were committed
12. We consider that this application is justified by the 
fact that the status determination officer and even the domestic courts dealing with the exclusion 
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clauses are not criminal tribunal and their evaluation does not attain the strictness of a criminal 
procedure. It follows that the individual would be found “guilty” outside the normal guarantees of a 
penal procedure.  
Thirdly, it is not definitively agreed as to the qualification of the terrorist acts, if they would 
fall under the “serious non-political crime” notion or the “acts contrary to the purposes and objectives 
of the United Nations” one. Still, the UNHCR seems to favor inclusion in the first category, as the 
methods and consequences are those of a serious non-political crime. This position is also more 
favorable to the individual, as in general, the perpetration of a serious non political crime is proved 
by the initiation of criminal proceedings, documents and evidence collected in the file, prosecution 
applications, and judicial decisions. A conclusion as to whether a person “is guilty” for an act 
contrary to the purposes and objectives of the United Nations, if that act is not at the same time a 
crime, is more difficult and the evaluation of individual responsibility, that does not benefit from the 
criminal standard, more fluid. 
 The judgment of the European Court of Justice 
In responding to the questions referred by the German Federal Administrative Court, the 
European instance considered, in the first place, the qualification to be given to terrorist acts; it 
concluded that those acts could fall to be regarded both as serious non political crimes and as acts 
contrary to the purposes and objectives of the United Nations. Still, as the language employed both 
by the Geneva Convention and the Directive 2004/83 shows, it is not sufficient that the organization 
to whom the person belongs had perpetrated such acts; it must be shown that the acts were 
committed by the person in question. Recalling the principle of individual responsibility, the 
European Court underlined that “the mere fact that the person concerned was a member of such an 
organization cannot automatically mean that that person must be excluded from refugee status 
pursuant to those provisions”
13.  
By way of consequence, although the domestic court provoked the re-qualification of the acts 
reproached to the applicants, the European instance refrained from making a choice; it is to be noted 
that this abstention from the European Court in not without consequences – as the first applicant had 
committed both acts as member of a terrorist organization but also murder. From the factual 
background, it follows that neither the domestic nor the European courts were interested with the 
second potential „serious non political crime”, only with the acts committed while a member of the 
organization.  
At the same time, the European Court’s directions as to the assessment of the individual 
responsibility, without clarifying the notion she is dealing with (non political crime or act contrary to 
the purposes and objective of the United Nations), would imply that the same standard of proof 
applies for serious crimes that are generally discovered upon extradition requests (that is, a criminal 
proceeding is ongoing or has been completed) and for the other acts. Although this could be regarded 
as a guarantee and applauded as such and we genuinely acknowledge its importance, it is worrying 
however that a person is evaluated as being “guilty” in the absence of specific guarantees and a 
specific procedure
14.  
  However, the European Court, in answering the third question, considered that, once the 
domestic authority or court has determined that the person in question has committed a crime so 
falling under the exclusion clauses, their effect is mandatory and the person is excluded from being a 
refugee.  
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The Court considered that no proportionality test is required, as the domestic instance has 
already, „in its assessment of the seriousness of the acts committed by the person concerned and of 
that person’s individual responsibility, taken into account all the circumstances surrounding those 
acts and the situation of that person”
15 . But a few paragraphs earlier, when indicating the elements to 
be taken into consideration, the Court only remembered: the true role played by the person concerned 
in the perpetration of the acts in question; his position within the organization; the extent of the 
knowledge he had, or was deemed to have, of its activities; any pressure to which he was exposed; or 
other factors likely to have influenced his conduct
16. The indication is correct as it only takes into 
account the demarche to determine whether the acts committed by the organization concerned meet 
the conditions laid down in exclusion provisions and whether individual responsibility for carrying 
out those acts can be attributed to the person concerned.  
Still, the proportionality test, that the Court obviates, is not reduced to just assessing the role 
or the subjective state of mind of the person concerned and is applied after the qualification of an act 
as serious non political crime or act contrary to the purposes and objectives of the United Nations. 
Among proportionality considerations one should take into account the period of time elapsed from 
the perpetration of facts, the punishment already completed, the age of the perpetrator at the moment 
of the fact, the fairness of the trial. By using these tools, even if one is in the presence of a serious 
non-political crime of an act contrary to the purposes and objectives of the United Nations, could 
decide, after balancing different interests, not o exclude the person concerned from being a refugee.  
The European Court is very firm in its position; the commission of a crime – against peace or 
humanity, war crime, non political one, contrary to the purposes of the United Nations – renders the 
perpetrator not worthy of the protection deriving from the refugee status. It is another way of 
proclaiming that refugee protection is for a person that is being persecuted, that suffering from a 
harm that is being illegitimately, maliciously and unjustifiably inflicted. The fact that a person is 
guilty of serious or - as the UNHCR put it - heinous acts, transforms him or her into an individual 
undeserving of protection. It is a clear vision of the refugee protection through asylum as a political 
instrument. In general terms, a political vision on asylum is concentrated on reaction for the 
protection of the persecuted (understood as persons chassed out of their political communities) but 
also for the chastising of the persecutory state for its conduct.  
From the fact that the European Court did not qualified the acts described in the present cases, 
it follows that its position is one of principle; irrespective of the type of crime, the person considered 
to be guilty is to be excluded from being a refugee. This is in line with the political view on refugee 
status; the moment a person, although persecuted or fearing persecution, is, on serious grounds, 
considered to have committed such a crime, she is no longer or anymore in the position to invoke the 
risk of persecution in order to keep its status.  
The revocation, cancellation or refusal to recognize the refugee status as a consequence for 
the application of an exclusion clause does not mean however the absence of all evaluation of the risk 
of a violation of fundamental human rights for that person, in case the exclusion clause is 
accompanied by an extradition request or by a decision to remove the person from the receiving 
State’s territory. Still, as explained in more detail bellow, the decision to stay an extradition or a 
return order will not imply the recognition of a certain status and the presence of the risk must be real 
and concrete. The Court itself recognize it in paragraph 110 of its decision: “it is important to note 
that the exclusion of a person from refugee … does not imply the adoption of a position on the 
separate question of whether that person can be deported to his country of origin”.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 European Court of Justice, judgment of 9 November 2010 (cases C-57/09 and C-101/09), para. 109 
16 European Court of Justice, judgment of 9 November 2010 (cases C-57/09 and C-101/09), para. 97 654  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Legal sciences 
3. Conclusions 
Divorcing the concept of refugee protection through asylum from the humanitarian goals 
promoted by the NHCR does not, in consequence, have the meaning of refusing all protection for a 
person confronted with a probable violation of her rights; it only tries to delimitate the refugee status 
from the humanitarian protection, that is subsidiary and non-distinctive, in the sense that is not 
sanctioning a distinctive kind of harm – persecution.  
It is too early to say if the trend emerging from this judgment will be consolidated; there some 
signs of interest from the part of domestic instances as well, which, by the questions referred to the 
European Courts, are provoking a new interpretation of the meaning of “membership of a particular 
social group” or a distinction among human rights violations that would or would not amount to 
persecution. The current intention of the European Court is also suggested by the total absence of any 
reference to the work or works of the UNHCR; however, it will certainly be difficult for the 
European Court to change the trend in a short term, as for many years the UNHCR has been the 
trainer of the domestic authorities, including in Europe and its lines of interpretation are just 
consolidating in the case-law of national bodies.  
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